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THE MOTION TO STRIKE OUT
THE EVIDENCE IN VIRGINIA
The motion to strike out evidence in Virginia may be directed against
a particular item of evidence, the testimony of a particular witness,
or it may be used to strike all the evidence. This article deals with the
motion to strike out all the evidence of one of the parties to the litiga-
tion. The scope of the article includes an examination of the motion
to strike, a comparison to the demurrer to the evidence, to the directed
verdict and to the motion for summary judgment and finally, to the
use of the motion to strike as used in the Court of Chancery in Virginia
and the Federal Courts. The importance of the motion to strike is
emphasized by the role it individually plays in these other motions.
The motion to strike itself is one of the main procedural methods in
use today in Virginia to take a question of law from the deliberation of
the jury and in its place substitute the judgment of the court.
THE MOTION TO STRIKE OUT THE EVIDENCE
In Green v. Smith,' the court stated the criterion for the application
of the motion to strike. "A motion to strike out all the evidence of the
adverse party is very far-reaching and should never be entertained where
it does not plainly appear that the trial court would be compelled to
set aside any verdict for the party whose evidence it is sought to strike
out." In a majority of jurisdictions the test for granting a motion to
strike the evidence is the so-called "reasonable minds" test. If reasonable
minds could reasonably come to but one conclusion on the evidence,
the court should direct the jury to find according to that one reasonable
conclusion. In Virginia Rule 3:20 of the Virginia Supreme Court of
Appeals seems to arrive at the reasonable minds test by providing that
if it appears upon sustaining a motion to _,rike the evidence, that the
moving party is entitled to judgment, the court shall enter judgment in
his favor. If any material fact is genuinely in dispute, however, this
cannot be done.2
A motion to strike out the evidence made at the conclusion of the
plaintiff's evidence in chief, but before the defendant has testified.
should not be sustained unless it is very plain that the court would be
compelled to set aside a verdict for the plaintiff upon a consideration
1. 153 Va. 675, 679, 151 SE. 282 (1930).
2. PHELps, HANDBOOK OF VIRGINIA Rums OF PROCEDURE IN ACTIONS AT LAW 226 (1959).
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of the evidence strictly as upon a demurrer to the evidence in light
of the fact that the defendant has seen fit not to testify and subject him-
self to cross-examination. 3 In considering the motion to strike the
plaintiff's evidence, all inferences which the jury might fairly draw
from the plaintiff's evidence must be drawn in his favor.4 Trial courts
in considering motions to strike the plaintiff's evidence should in every
case where there is doubt on the question overrule the motion. The use
of the motion as a means to defeat the plaintiff's action should be con-
fined and applied only to those cases in which it is conclusively ap-
parent that the plaintiff has proven no cause of action against the de-
fendant5
The motion to strike may be made at the conclusion of the taking of
the plaintiff's evidence in chief or at the conclusion of the taking of
the evidence of both parties. If the motion to strike is made at the
conclusion of the taking of the plaintiff's evidence and is overruled,
if the defendant then introduces his evidence, as he may do, he should
then renew his motion at the conclusion of the taking of all the evidence
or his original motion to strike will be deemed to have been waived.
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure also apparently call for a renewal
under Rule 50 (b).7
By Virginia's Supreme Court of Appeals Rule 1:1li-Striking the
Evidence-if the court sustains a motion to strike the evidence of either
party in a civil case being tried before a jury, or the evidence of the
Commonwealth in a criminal case, the court may then discharge thejury and enter judgment in favor of the moving party. If the court
overrules a motion to strike the evidence and there is a hung jury, and
if the court is of the opinion that it erred in denying the motion to
strike, it may enter judgment in favor of the moving party. Turk v.
Clark" answered a further procedural question on the motion to strike.
Where both parties move to strike the evidence, the case is taken from
the jury and the court determines the facts and enters final judgment.
"In theory both parties are requesting the court to decide that as a
matter of law they are entitled to a final judgment. If each is honest
S. Gray v. Van Zaig, 185 Va. 7, 37 S.E.2d 751 (1946).
4. Hoover v. J. P. Neff & Son, 183 Va. 56, 31 S.E.2d 265 (1944).
5. BumKS, PLEADING AND PRACnC § 284 (4th Ed. Boyd 1952).
6. Virginia Elec. & Power Co. v. Mitchell, 159 Va. 855, 164 S.E. 800, 167 S.E. 424
(1932); Rawle v. McIlheney, 163 Va. 735, 117 S.E.2d 214, 98 AL.R. 930 (1934).
7. Fm. R. Civ. P. 50 (B).
8. VA. Sup. CT. OF APPEALs RuLEs OF PRACrICE AND PROCEDURE 1:11.
9. 193 Va. 774, 71 S.E.2d 172 (1952).
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in his contention there is some reason for saying that one or the other is
right. Such a rule is highly artificial, however, and is likely to lead to
unnecessary technical errors with respect to the effect of simultaneous
motions by the parties. This Virginia practice is not followed under
the Federal Rules." 10
If either party desires to apply for a writ of error from the judgment
of the court, assigning as error the ruling of the trial court on the motion
to strike out the evidence, he must except to the ruling of the trial court
at the time it was made; after judgment he must then make the evi-
dence, the motion to strike, and the ruling of the trial judge therein
a part of the record. He then proceeds to apply for a writ of error as
in any other civil case." If the writ of error is granted, the following
situations may be presented.' 2 Where the trial court erroneously sus-
tained the motion to strike and entered judgment for the moving party,
the case should be remanded for a new trial.'3 Where the trial court
properly overrules the motion to strike and there is a verdict against
the moving party, there is no error as far as the ruling of the trial court
on the motion to strike is concerned, and the judgment of the trial
court should be affirmed unless there was some other assignment of
error. 4 Finally, where the trial court improperly overrules the motion
to strike and there was a verdict against the moving party, the Supreme
Court of Appeals would enter judgment in favor of the party originally
making the motion. If the motion to strike should have been sustained,
the party whose evidence ought to be struck out has failed to prove any
case in law against the moving party and therefore final judgment
should be entered for the moving party.15
THE DEMURRER TO THE EVIDENCE AND THE MOTION TO STRIKE
A motion to strike out irrelevant evidence or evidence improperly
admitted is always proper. If evidence is relevant to the issue, although
entitled to but little weight, it is generally admissible, and a motion to
reject when offered, or to strike it out after it had been received,
10. Supra note 2 at 69 (Cum. Supp. 1962).
11. VA. Sup. CT. OF APPEALS RuLEs OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 5:1.
12. Barksdale v. Southern Ry. Co., 152 Va. 604, 148 S.E. 683 (1929).
13. Green v. Smith, 153 Va. 675, 151 S.E. 282 (1930); Buchanan v. Wilson, 159 Va.
49, 165 S.E. 422 (1932); Catron v. Burchfield, 159 Va. 60, 165 S.E. 499 (1932); Mears
v. Accomac Banking Co, 160 Va. 311, 168 S.E. 740 (1933); Bray v. Boston etc., Corp.,
161 Va. 686, 172 S.E. 296 (1934).
14. Supra note 6.
15. Jones v. Massie, 158 Va. 121, 163 S.E. 63 (1932).
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is inapplicable. If relevant, but not deemed sufficient to maintain the
issue joined, the opposing party should enter a demurrer to the evidence
and not move to strike out. This was the early Virginia doctrine which
held that a motion to strike out was not equivalent to a demurrer to
the evidence.16 This doctrine, however, has been ignored by the Vir-
ginia Supreme Court of Appeals and has been overruled by the sub-
sequent decisions of the court. "It is now well settled in Virginia that
a motion to strike out all the evidence may be used whenever a demurrer
to the evidence by the defendant will lie, or it plainly appears that the
trial court would be compelled to set aside any verdict found for the
plaintiff as being without evidence to support it." 17
The court in Dudley v. Guthrie held that although the use of the
motion to strike out the evidence is sanctioned under Virginia pro-
cedure, the motion should not be granted unless it is very plain that
the court would be compelled to set aside a verdict for the plaintiff,
considering the evidence strictly as upon a demurrer thereto." , The
motion to strike is a substitute for a demurrer to the evidence and will
lie whenever a demurrer to the evidence could be used. 9 If a demurrer
to the evidence should be sustained, the motion to strike out the evidence
should be sustained but not otherwise.2 0
The motion to strike and the demurrer to the evidence, although
used under similar circumstances, have several important differences
which should be thoroughly examined. Unlike a demurrer to the evi-
dence, a motion to strike out all the evidence is not a pleading. There-
fore it is not per se a part of the record until lodged with the clerk of
the court under Rule 5:1 Sec. 3 (a).21 If either party desires to have
the ruling of the trial court on the motion to strike reviewed on writ
of error, exception should be taken thereto. All the evidence and the
exception should be made a part of the record as required by the ap-
plicable Virginia Rules of Court.22
A second important difference, which existed prior to 1961, was
16. Buchanan v. Wilson, 159 Va. 49, 56, 165 S.E. 422 (1932).
17. Green v. Smith, 153 Va. 675, 151 S.E. 282 (1930); See also, Richardson v. Ap-
palachian Elec. Power Co, 163 Va. 394, 175 S.E. 727 (1934); Hoover v. J. P. Neff &
Son, 183 Va. 56, 31 S.E. 2d 265 (1944); Stockton v. Charlottesville, 178 Va. 164, 16
S.E.2d 376 (1941); Boulevard Apartments v. Evans, 177 Va. 315, 14 S.E.2d 310 (1941);
Ward v. Clark, 163 Va. 770, 177 S.E. 212 (1934).
18. 192 Va. 1, 63 S.E.2d 737, (1951).
19. Supra note 1.
20. Barnes v. Mabry, 186 Va. 243, 42 S.E.2d 304 (1947).
21. Supra note 11.
22. Supra note 5 at 510.
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that unlike a demurrer to the evidence, the motion to strike need not
be in writing and was made orally to the court and the grounds there-
fore assigned. There was no question of joinder by the party in the
motion to strike as would be the case in a demurrer to the evidence,
where evidence was sought to be struck out. The motion was simply
argued before the court as in the case of other motions made during
the trial. However, by Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals Rule 1:3,
as amended in 1961, it was specifically provided that "all motions,
except for the qualification of attorneys at law to practice in this
Court, shall be in writing and shall not be argued orally except by
special leave of the Court." 23 This rule does not affect procedure in the
trial courts and oral argument is retained.
Green v. Smith points up an additional difference bepween the motion
to strike and the demurrer to the evidence. "Upon an adverse ruling
by the court the defendant is entitled to have submitted to the jury
both the question of the plaintiff's right to recover and the measure
of recovery, while a demurrer to the evidence finally takes away from
the jury all considerations of the plaintiff's right of recovery and
submits it to the court." 24 In essence, the defendant may take the
opinion of the court on the sufficiency in law of the plaintiff's evidence
to maintain his cause of action without losing his right to have the jury
pass on the merits of the plaintiff's claim.25
On a demurrer to the evidence, while it is true that the defendant
must set out the grounds of his demurrer with considerable par-
ticularity,2 6 yet the defendant will attempt to state them as generally
as he can. The plaintiff may fail to discover the real weakness in his
case that the defendant relies on until the argument on the demurrer,
but this does not take place until the jury has retired from the court-
room to assess the damages subject to the ruling of the court on the
demurrer to the evidence. At this point in the trial it is too late for the
plaintiff to take a voluntary nonsuit if he thinks he can better his
position in another trial, or to introduce additional evidence, or to
amend his declaration.2' On the other hand, the motion to strike out
the evidence is argued before the jury retires to consider its verdict, and
the real ground for the motion can be adduced by the plaintiff on the
argument. Therefore the plaintiff will be in a position to amend his
23. VA. Sup. CT. OF APPEALS RumEs OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 1:3.
24. Supra note 1.
25. Supra note 5 at 512.
26. VA. CODE ANN. § 8-140 (1950) (REPL. VOL. 1957).
27. Cooper v. Norfolk Southern Ry. Co., 125 Va. 73, 99 SYE. 606 (1919).
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declaration, introduce additional evidence or take a voluntary nonsuit. s
Objections made under the motion to strike give rise to benefits for
both the plaintiff and defendant and on the whole it would seem there
is less risk of a miscarriage of justice under the motion to strike than
under the cumbersome and harsh procedure of the demurrer to the
evidence.
Jones v. Hanbury2g extends the application of the motion to strike
by a more liberal interpretation after the evidence of both parties has
been presented. A motion to strike out made at the close of the plain-
tiff's evidence should not be sustained unless it is very plain that the
court would be compelled to set aside a verdict for the plaintiff upon
a consideration of the evidence strictly as upon a demurrer to the
evidence and in light of the fact that the defendant has seen fit not to
testify and subject himself to cross-examination. "Where a motion to
strike out is made after all the evidence for both parties has been in-
troduced, a somewhat more liberal rule is sometimes applied for the
consideration of evidence in passing upon the motion." 30 The more
liberal rule is that the evidence will be viewed as on a motion to set aside
the verdict as contrary to the evidence. This seems to imply that the
court will view the evidence strictly as on a demurrer to the evidence
only where the motion to strike is made at the conclusion of plaintiff's
evidence in chief and where the facts and circumstances of the case lie
within the knowledge of the defendant, or of both the plaintiff and the
defendant. The court believes that in such case, particularly as the
defendant has seen fit not to testify and thus subject himself to a
cross-examination, the strict demurrer to the evidence rule should
be applied, but when this is not the case, the evidence should be viewed
more on an analogy to a motion to set aside the verdict as contrary
to the evidence rather than to a demurrer to the evidence.31
THE MOTION FOR A DIRECTED VERDICT
The motion to strike the evidence has had significant influence on
the motion for a directed verdict. Virginia Code See. 8-218 originally
prohibited the court from directing a verdict. As a result the motion
to strike the evidence developed to perform the essential function of the
prohibited motion for a directed verdict. "The motion to strike was
28. Supra note 5 at 513.
29. 158 Va. 842, 164 S.E. 545 (1932).
30. Id. at 846.
31. Supra note 5 at 514.
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soon held by the Court of Appeals of Virginia to be tantamount to a
motion for a directed verdict and it was granted under procedures and
principles identical in all important respects to those followed in states
permitting the motion for a directed verdict." 32 As declared in Small
v. Virginia R., etc., Co.,3 Sec. 8-218 was passed for the express purpose
of prohibiting the application of a doctrine of harmless error to the
mandatory direction of verdicts. Under this section even in a case where
no other verdict could have been properly rendered, and the error might
therefore have been regarded as harmless, yet a peremptory instruction
directing the verdict was regarded as prejudicial and reversible error.34
Where the court simply struck out the evidence offered by a party
because no verdict could be properly rendered, thereon sustaining the
contention of the party moving to strike the evidence, it did not
direct a verdict in violation of Sec. 8-218.a1 This section forbade the
trial court from directing a verdict, but under Virginia practice it was
still possible to accomplish the same results: a demurrer to the evidence
may be interposed; evidence may be stricken out; the trial court may set
aside the verdict and in a proper case give final judgment; the trial court
may decline to give any instruction where the evidence would not
sustain a verdict, and it may in substance direct a verdict by stating
in an instruction a hypothetical case and telling the jury if they so
believe, to find accordingly. 36
The 1958 amendment to Sec. 8-218 provides: "In no action tried be-
fore a jury shall the trial judge give to the jury a peremptory instruction
directing what verdict the jury shall render unless the trial judge shall
have granted a motion to strike the evidence of the plaintiff or de-
fendant, in which case the judge may direct a verdict in conformity
with his ruling on the motion to strike." -7 The motion to strike has
thus become a necessary precedent to the motion to direct a verdict
in Virginia. Turner v. Burford Buick Corporation"s effectively sum-
marized the inter-relation of the two motions. The court declared
that because of the requirements of amended sec. 8-218 it was im-
proper for a court to direct a verdict for the plaintiff without a prior
striking of the defendant's evidence, even though the evidence showed
32. Id. at 507 n. 77.
33. 125 Va. 416, 99 S.E. 225 (1919).
34. Ibid.
35. Barksdale v. Southern Ry. Co., 152 Va. 604, 148 S.E. 683 (1929).
36. Davis v. Rodgers, 139 Va. 618, 124 S.E. 408 (1924).
37. VA. CoDE AN-,N. § 8-218 (1958 AMEND.).
38. 201 Va. 693, 112 S.E.2d 911 (1960).
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that the defendant was guilty of negligence as a matter of law. Rule
3:20 of the Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals, providing for sum-
mary judgment upon the sustaining of the motion to strike, now pro-
vides the procedure to be followed under this situation." Thus in Vir-
ginia the motion for summary judgment has effectively surplanted the
directed verdict but the sustaining of the motion to strike is still re-
quired before the motion for summary judgment will be granted.
The motion to strike has not played a parallel role of importance in
the development of the motion to set aside the verdict. The motion
to set aside the verdict as a test of the sufficiency of the evidence is
permitted by Virginia Code Sec. 8-352. "In a civil case a defendant
has the option of making a motion to strike the evidence of the plaintiff
from the case, demurring to the evidence, or awaiting the verdict of
the jury." 40 The sufficiency of the evidence may be challenged by a
motion to strike, but may also be challenged by a motion to set aside
the verdict, even though no motion to strike has been made.41 The
motion to strike, therefore, is not a necessary precedent to the motion
to set aside the verdict.
THE MOTION FOR SUMMIARY JUDGMENT
The sustaining of a motion to strike is also one ground upon which
summary judgment may be granted in Virginia. "Either party may
make a motion for summary judgment at any time after the parties are
at issue. If it appears from the pleadings, if any, in the proceedings, or
upon sustaining a motion to strike the evidence, that the moving party
is entitled to judgment, the court shall enter judgment in his favor..." '
Under early Virginia practice if the court sustained the motion to
strike, the case was nevertheless submitted to the jury,43 but as all the
evidence of one of the parties had been struck out, and therefore could
not be considered by the jury, their verdict had to be for the party
whose motion to strike had been sustained. A different verdict would
be set aside by the trial court and a final judgment would be entered
for the party prevailing on the motion to strike.44 Under Rule 1:1 1 45
of the Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals, "if the court sustains a
39. VA. Sup. CT. Op APPEALS RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 3:20.
40. VA. CODE ANN. § 8-352 (1950) (REPL. VOL. 1957).
41. Gabbard v. Knight, 202 Va. 40, 116 S.E.2d 73 (1960).
42. Supra note 39.
43. Supra note 13.
44. Ibid.
45. Supra note 8.
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motion to strike the evidence of either party in a civil case being tried
before a jury ...then the court may discharge the jury and enter
judgment in favor of the moving party." Thus it might seem per-
missive to send the case to the jury even after the motion to strike has
been sustained. However, Rule 3:20 of the Supreme Court of Appeals,
providing for summary judgment, must be read in conjunction with
Rule 1:11 when the motion to strike has been sustained. "If it ap-
pears, . . . upon sustaining a motion to strike the evidence, that the mov-
ing party is entitled to judgment, the court shall enter judgment in his
favor." 46 The court may therefore, upon sustaining the motion to
strike, take the case from the jury under a motion for summary judg-
ment and prevent the case from reaching the jury. If the court over-
rules the motion to strike, the trial continues as if the motion had not
been made. The case is submitted to the jury and they return their
verdict as in the trial of any civil case.
Summary judgment is an important part of any rule simplifying
pleading because it prevents parties from trying to make an issue when
in fact they have no real claim or defense The 1957 amendment to
Rule 3:20 changing "the admissions, if any, in a deposition" to "the
admissions, if any, in the proceedings" and providing for a summary
judgment on the sustaining of a motion to strike the evidence, sub-
stantially improved the effectiveness of the rule in this respect.48 In
Carwile v. Richmond Newspapers,49 a case prior to the 1957 amend-
ment, the court declared that the motion for summary judgment was
not intended as a substitute for a demurrer to the evidence or a motion
to strike. If this case had been strictly applied it would have made the
summary judgment rule largely ineffective since it would strictly
limit the scope of this rule. The 1957 amendment to Rule 3:20 recog-
nized this and included the motion to strike within the limits of the
rule. 0
As previously pointed out, the 1957 amendment to the summary
judgment rule permitted the court to grant such a judgment upon sus-
taining a motion to strike the evidence. The problem of the power
of the court in this respect was also clarified by the 1958 amendment
in 8-218 of the Virginia Code which permits the court to direct a
46. Supra note 39.
47. CLARK, CODE PI..ADING 556-567 (2nd ed., 1947).
48. Supra note 2 at 254.
49. 196 Va. 1, 82 S.E.2d 588 (1954).
50. Supra note 2 at 255.
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verdict where a motion to strike the evidence has been granted. 1
Clark v. Kimnarcb,52 indicated the desirability of using summary judg-
ment when a motion to strike was granted. Here there was no evidence
that the operator of an automobile was the owner's agent. The court
held a motion to strike was in effect asking for a summary judgment,
and the court had power to enter it even though no verdict had been
returned as to the owner. Plaintiff argued without success that there
was no basis for a judgment for the defendant owner since there was
no verdict on the question.
THE MOTION TO STRIKE OUT EVIDENCE IN CHANCERY
The motion to strike out the evidence in Virginia has not been
limited to actions at law but has been extended to the Chancery side of
the court. In any chancery cause when a defendant moves to strike
out all the evidence, upon any grounds, and such motion is overruled
by the court, such defendant shall not thereafter be precluded from
introducing evidence in its own behalf, and the procedure shall be
the same and shall have the same effect as the motion to strike the
evidence in an action at law.53
THE MOTION TO STRIKE OUT EVIDENCE UNDER FEDERAL PROCEDURE
Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, instead of the motion
to strike the evidence, a similar principle is applied in non-jury cases
under Rule 41 (b) 4 providing for dismissal of actions. "After the
plaintiff, in an action tried by the court without a jury,= has com-
pleted the presentation of his evidence, the defendant, without waiving
his right to offer evidence in the event the motion is not granted, may
move for a dismissal on the ground that upon the facts and the law the
plaintiff has shown no right to relief. The court as trier of facts may then
determine them and render judgment against the plaintiff or may de-
cline to render any judgment until the close of all the evidence. If the
court renders judgment on the merits against the plaintiff, the court
shall make findings as provided in Rule 52 (a)." " Under this rule,
the judge, where the case is tried without a jury, may pass on conflicts
51. ld. at 257.
52. 198 Va. 737, 96 S.E.2d 780 (1957).
53. PHEi s, HANDBoOK OF VIRGINIA RUI.ms OF EQurrY PRACnCF AND PROMDUilE 85 (1961).
54. FED. R. Civ. P. 41 (B).
55. FED. R. Civ. P. 41 (B) (1963 AMEND).
56. Ibid.
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of evidence and credibility of witnesses, making his function in such
cases broader than under the motion to strike the evidence in Virginia.'-
In a case tried without a jury when a motion to dismiss is made for
insufficiency of the evidence, it is the duty of the court to weigh care-
fully the plaintiff's evidence.18 If the court finds the plaintiff's evidence
insufficient, it must render judgment on the merits for the defendant,59
and make findings of fact as provided in Rule 52 (a) and as expressly
required by Rule 41 (b) ." Conversely, if the defendant's motion is
denied, and he offers no evidence, the court may make findings of fact
and conclusions of law and render judgment for the plaintiff.6 ' An
involuntary dismissal with prejudice should not be ordered, if on the
facts it appears that any relief could be granted. The scintilla rule is
not followed by federal courts, and there must be substantial evidencc
to support a claim for relief before the defendant will be required to
defend.6
The motion for dismissal at the close of the plaintiff's evidence could
formerly be made in a case tried by a jury as well as in a case tried
without a jury. When made in a jury-tried case, this motion overlapped
the motion for a directed verdict under Rule 50 (a) 3 which was also
available in the same situation. O'Brien v. Westinghouse 4 held that the
standard to be applied in deciding the motion for dismissal at the close
of the plaintiff's evidence in a jury-tried case is the same as that used
upon a motion for a directed verdict made at the same point; and
just as the court need not make findings pursuant to Rule 52 (a)6 '
when it directs a verdict, so in a jury-tried case it may omit these find-
ings in granting the motion for dismissal. As indicated by the discus-
sion in O'Brien, the overlap between Rule 50 (a) and Rule 41 (b)
has caused considerable confusion. Accordingly Rule 41 (b) was
amended in 1963 to provide that the dismissal at the close of the plain-
tiff's evidence shall apply only to non-jury cases. Hereafter the correct
motion in jury-tried cases will be the motion for a directed verdict.
The motion to strike out the evidence has developed as an equivalent
57. Supra note 53 at 86.
58. United States v. Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp., 137 F. Supp. 78 (D.C. Cal.
1956).
59. Bach v. Friden Calculating Mach. Co., 148 F.2d 407 (6th Cir. 1945).
60. Interborough News Co, v. Curtis Pub. Co, 127 F. Supp. 286 (D.C. N.Y. 1954).
61. Chicago and N.W. Ry. Co., v. Frochling Supply Co., 179 F.2d 133 (7th Cir 1950).
62. Carew v. R. K. 0. Radio Pictures, 43 F. Supp. 199 (D.C. Cal. 1942).
63. FE. R. Civ. P. 50 (A).
64. 293 F. 2d 1 (3rd Cir. 1961).
65. FF.D. R. Civ. P. 52 (A).
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to the demurrer to the evidence and has become an essential preliminary
motion to the subsequent motion for a directed verdict and the motion
for summary judgment. The single importance of this motion cannot
be over-emphasized in the procedural role which has been cast upon it
in the law and equity courts of Virginia. The motion to strike has be-
come the dominant procedural technique used to withdraw a decision
from the jury, where the question is one of law, and in its place to
substitute the determination of the court. The wisdom of this motion
is emphasized in the light of the affirmative results it has produced
in rendering justice to plaintiff and defendant alike.
1. Brendel
